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RicHARD HOFRICHTER, Neighborhood Justice in Capitalist Society: The Expansion of
the Informal State. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Pp. 192. $35.00.
CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalization of
Alternatives to Court. New York: Greenwood Press, 1985. Pp. x+216.
$29.95.
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D. GREEN, AND FRANK E. A. SANDER, Dispute Reso-
lution. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1985. Pp. 594. $28.00
INTRODUCTION
Early writing on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)-that loose col-
lection of decentralized, deformalized procedures, including mediation, arbi-
tration, ombudsmen, consumer complaint panels, and neighborhood justice
centers-was almost uniformly congratulatory.' The movement appealed
Richard Delgado is Chapman Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Tulsa
School of Law; Professor of Law, University of California-Davis. J.D. 1974, University of
California-Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law.
The author is indebted to his colleague, Mar Matsuda, for inspiration and criticism, and to
Kathleen Bliss and Craig Reffner, his research asssistants.
1. E.g., Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, 16 Judges J. 23 (Fall 1977); id, Isn't There a Better
Way? 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. I 11 (1976);
Bok, Law and Its Discontents: A Critical Look at Our Legal System, Bar Leader, Mar.-Apr. 1983,
at 21. Recently, a revision of a Civil Procedure casebook was promoted in the following terms:
Within the past decade the winds of change in American civil procedure have been blowing
with extraordinary force. The most portentous draft is the one that has alerted the country
to the need for non-court alternatives to resolve legal disputes. Judges, scholars, legislators
and bar leaders are searching energetically for new mechanisms. A major "alternatives"
movement has developed in the law and the law schools. Courses in civil procedure already
feel the effects of this movement .... Casebooks clearly must reflect this development.
0 1988 American Bar Foundation 145
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both to the technocratic-managerial instincts of the right and moderate
center, as well as to the desire of many on the political left to avoid the polari-
zation, contentiousness, and all-or-nothing character of formal, in-court jus-
tice. Drawing support from across the spectrum, the ADR movement grew
rapidly.
The first wave of writing praising ADR emphasized both quantitative and
qualitative virtues. Backers urged that informal justice could help clear con-
gested court calendars and save governments, as well as disputants, time and
money.2 Many maintained that ADR could provide not only speedy and inex-
pensive justice but higher quality justice as well. ADR was nonintimidating.
It could attract disputants who were put off by the formality and jargon of the
judicial system.3 Moreover, ADR promised solutions that were more flexible
and humane than those that could be obtained in court. Alternative proce-
dures could frame a "creative" solution to the disputants' problems, one that
avoided the all-or-nothing, win-lose feature of judicial resolution. ADR could
thus protect the feelings and possibility of a continuing relationship among
the parties, both substantial goods.4 Scholarship and speeches in this vein-
promoting ADR for its purported quantitative and qualitative benefits-pro-
liferated. A recent bibliography of writings on ADR contains over 65 pages of
titles, almost all in a positive vein.
5
More recent writings about ADR have been more nuanced. Several
respected writers have criticized the politics of ADR or questioned its ability
to deliver the promised benefits. 6 At the same time, the proponents' claims
have become more modest and less global. Many have retreated from the
early optimistic quantitative claims-according to which ADR would ease
court congestion and clear dockets, for example-to the less easily attacked
position that irrespective of quantitative virtues, alternative justice was qualita-
tively better than the standard kind. 7
Three recent books illustrate this trend. Richard Hofrichter's Neighbor-
hood Justice in Capitalist Society: The Expansion of the Informal State, is a powerful
Foundation Press, Announcing a Major Revision of a Renowned Casebook 1 (Jan. 1985) (promo-
tional release on file with author).
2. See Burger, sources cited in note 1; Miranker, Silicon Valley Courts Alternatives to Law-
suits, S.F. Examiner, Dec. 1, 1985, at D-1, col. 1.
3. E.g., Bok, Bar Leader (cited in note I).
4. E.g., Preface, Dispute Resolution, 88 Yale L.J. 905 (1979); Cattani, From Courthouses of
Many Doors to Third Party Intervenors, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 17, 1979, at 12-13; McKay,
Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 31 U. Kan. L. Rev. 355, 369 (1983).
5. American Bar Association Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolu-
tion, A Selected Bibliography (1985).
6. E.g., Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in R. Abel, ed., 1 The Politics of Infor-
mal Justice 267 (1982) ("Abel, Politics"); Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 Yale L. J.
998 (1979); Hofrichter, Justice Centers Raise Basic Questions, in Neighborhood Justice: Assess-
ment of an Emerging Idea 193 (1982); Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359.
7. See J. Marks, E. Johnson, & P. Szanton, Dispute Resolution in America: Processes in
Evolution 51-56 (1984) (recognizing problems with ADR); see also the discussion that follows
immediately here.
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critique from the left. Focusing on NJCs, Hofrichter argues that these forums
are not supported by nor responsive to the communities they serve. Rather,
the typical center is "an alien institution inserting itself into the community,
using the discourse, interactions and values of community culture against it-
self" (at xxiii). The centers do this by devoting more energy to "cooling out"
disputants than to determining on whose side justice lies (at 151). Moreover,
by atomizing disputes and focusing on the particular, they discourage political
organizing, legitimate austerity, and extend state power into areas of life where
it formerly did not reach (at xiv, xxv, 89-95, 110, 151). There is little indige-
nous clamor or support for NJCs in the communities they serve; they must
rely on publicity and referrals from courts for clients (at 98-99). NJCs thus
employ the rhetoric, but not the reality, of community-a force normally op-
posed to capitalism-in a kind of thinly veiled co-optation. The rhetoric of
justice, rights, conflict recedes, replaced by that of compromise, feelings, and a
version of community that looks suspiciously like the status quo (at 110, 142-
58).
A second book about NJCs, Christine Harrington's Shadow Justice: The
Ideology and Institutionalization of Alternatives to Court, echoes some of these
same conclusions but incorporates a sociological-empirical dimension. Draw-
ing on earlier work by Richard Abel and other critical writers, Harrington
puts forward the postulate that deformalized justice is concerned more with
order maintenance than social justice (at 2-5, 43-72). Although its backers
rarely admit it, deformalized justice is a technique by which managerialism
uses state power and persuasion to defuse confrontation (at 43-72, 170). ADR
extends state power by co-opting potential sources of opposition and by inject-
ing bureaucratic-managerial objectives and values into community life (at 15,
106, 170). Yet this transformation appears noncoercive, freely adopted by the
disputants and the communities they represent. ADR works by appearing to
give disputants benefits and incentives in return for their agreement to medi-
ate; the carrot is used more often than the stick (at 96, 105-37, 170-73). Yet,
her study of the Kansas NJC found a large proportion of court-referred cases,
where coercion plainly played an important part in bringing parties to the
center (at 108-21).
Harrington lays out the contradictions not only of ADR's rhetoric and
publicity but also of the means it uses to measure its own success. Many of
ADR's claims rest on user satisfaction surveys. Yet, Harrington observes, sat-
isfaction is a measure of the discrepancy between what a disputant expects and
what he or she gets. Since ADR frequently draws only on those who want
informality, it is not surprising that they are satisfied when they receive it (at
141-44). The many grievants who do not opt for an ADR forum are never
canvassed; their feelings about ADR are never reflected in the survey results.
When, due to subtle or not-so-subtle pressures, unwilling disputants are
brought before a deformalized forum, the forum typically cools out their ex-
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pectations long before a result is reached (at 89-90, disputes redefined; see also
Hofrichter at 151). This reduction of expectations also contributes to higher
reported satisfaction. Harrington's book concludes by deeming ADR a move-
ment of "anxious professionals and unwilling participants." 8
A third book, Goldberg, Green, and Sander's Dispute Resolution, a
casebook intended for use in law school courses, presents a mixed message.
Many of the articles reprinted or excerpted have an uncritical, "booster" tone
or else assume the validity of ADR's premises and goals 9 (something that Har-
rington does not do); yet, other selections-and especially the authors' intro-
ductory and connecting passages-are reflective and circumscribed in their
claims. For example, the Goldberg et al. materials raise the question whether
ADR may injure women in the course of divorce or domestic mediation;'
0
whether mediation and settlement compromise broad lawmaking functions
and reaffirmation of principle, for the sake of peace (at 14, 490); whether
ADR's qualitative and quantitative superiority over adjudication can be veri-
fied empirically (at 5-6, 14); and whether deformalized justice is possible when
the disputants have differing levels of prestige and power (at 11, 113, 490).
Thus, while the book is vulnerable to criticism, " it at least has the virtue of
being more even-handed than most previous collections about ADR.
A basic presupposition of the Goldberg et al. book, as well as of much
other work in the pro-ADR vein, is that the limitations and dangers of ADR
can be avoided by vigilance-by being aware of and making allowances for
them (at 10-11, 150, 162-63). If we wish to retain the benefits of ADR and
avoid the detriments, it is only necessary to perform functional analysis, so
that cases are referred to the "correct" forum (id.).
The remainder of my essay questions the feasibility of this general ap-
proach, putting forward two lines of criticism of ADR's goals and means. Part
I proposes that ADR is in many cases not a method of addressing disputes or
social problems but rather of avoiding them. Part II suggests that when an
alternative forum considers claims pressed by certain classes of grievants, the
forum's structure exposes them to an increased risk of an outcome colored by
prejudice. If either criticism has merit-if ADR either denies problems or
makes them worse-no amount of tailoring-to-forum will bring redemption.
8. Harrington at 172-73, quoting U.S., Dep't of Justice & Nat'l Inst. for Dispute Resolution,
Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy, Paths to Justice 2-3 (1983).
9. Passages that appear to treat nonformalism as an unqualified good appear throughout the
Goldberg et al. volume, e.g., 33-49 (how to negotiate effectively); 102-4 (how to get people to
mediate); 196-201 (how to be an ethical arbitrator); 271-288 (how to save time and money with
mini-trials); 347-69 (ch. 7, "Neighborhood Justice Centers") (enthusiastic treatment of NJCs, con-
trasting markedly with those of Hofrichter and Harrington); 503-16 (how to get funding for
nonformal programs); 539-54 (planning to integrate ADR into legal process).
10. ld. at 11, 502. See also Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and
Problems, 2 Law & Inequality J. 21 (1984) (cited elsewhere in volume); Lefcourt, Women, Media-
tion, and Family Law, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 266 (1984) (warning of ADR's ineffectuality in
spousal abuse cases).
11. See in this issue Barbara Yngvesson, Disputing Alternatives: Settlement as Science and
as Politics; 13 Law & Soc. Inquiry 000 (1988) (reviewing the Goldberg et al. volume).
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HOW TO SOLVE INTRACTABLE SOCIAL PROBLEMS-
ADR AND THE POLITICS OF DEFORMALIZATION
There are only a handful of basic ways in which our society responds to
insoluble social problems-ones that, like blacks' demands for justice, wo-
men's claims for comparable worth, consumers' demands for well-made, rea-
sonably priced goods, workers' demands for a larger share of the industrial pie,
and everyone's desire for a safe, nonpolluted environment, cannot be solved
at an acceptable cost.'
2
If those agitating for reform are aroused and united, we cannot dismiss
their problem as a nonproblem or the claimants as nonpersons (as we once did
with slaves or do today with children and the insane). That would simply
inflame them further. The only solution is to seem to be addressing the prob-
lem, but without doing anything that threatens the status quo too drastically.
This can be done in either of two ways: As with civil rights law, we can
redefine the problem so that it becomes very small and circumscribed.' 3
Then, we can use rhetoric and repetition in an effort to get everyone to accept
that this is what the problem really is. Thus, we can adopt rules requiring
narrow chains of causation, an intent requirement, and elevate formal neutral-
ity above nonsubordination principles-and say, "If you (Third World plain-
tiff) satisfy all these requirements, then and only then has there been
redressable racism."' 4 Outside this area, complaints are nonracial, mere gen-
eralized lamentations that the world is not perfect. Indeed, continued agita-
tion can be used against the grievants. With all our carefully designed
remedial law in place, minorities' failure to succeed only proves their lack of
ability or unwillingness to work hard; their continuing demands, their lack of
reasonableness and desire for something more than fairness-for handouts
and coddling.' 5
This first route has been highly successful. It has kept down the number
of racial-justice claims, delegitimized others, and forced minority claimants to
negotiate a labyrinth of technical obstacles. A small liability with this ap-
proach is that a few plaintiffs will successfully negotiate the maze and prevail
in court. 16 But this may turn out to be an advantage. The rare perpetrator
found guilty of intentional, narrowly defined racism can be seized and made
the object of a public degradation ceremony.' 7 The rarity of such events con-
12. See, e.g., Bell, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 Calif. L.
Rev. 1 (1979); D. Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law 1-51 (1980) (cost of racial justice for
blacks too high; whites refuse to pay it, instead shift cost to blacks and lower-class whites).
13. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978).
14. See id.
15. See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want? 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 302, 303-10 (1987).
16. Cf. Delgado et al., 1985 Wis. L. Rev. (cited in note 6) (suggesting that, for minorities,
formal in-court adjudication is preferable to its alternatives).
17. See Freeman, 62 Minn. L. Rev. (cited in note 13) (discussing "perpetrator" perspective,
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vinces us that racism is indeed aberrant and outside the norm-an anomaly in
an otherwise healthy, nonracist social system. 18
This tack-narrow definition of the problem-will work well with popu-
lations that have great respect for the law and will accept its redefinition of
their problem uncomplainingly, or who believe they can somehow turn the
concrete formality of race reform law to their advantage.' 9
A second approach is to enlarge the problem-to concede its existence
but insist that it is much broader than most realize, that its solution entails
expanding the context and taking account of a multitude of factors not ordi-
narily considered part of the problem.20 This magnified version of the dispute
must then be given to a decisionmaker of great wisdom and discretion, one
capable of taking into account many things at once-the background of the
dispute, the setting against which it occurs, the nature of the disputants, their
past, present, and likely future relationship, and so on.2' When "the prob-
lem" is transformed into something so complex and multifaceted that no sim-
ple legal formula can encompass it, it is also likely that no single remedy-such
as an injunction or damages-can solve it. Instead, we must strive to avoid
simplistic win-lose thinking and look for creative solutions that maximize
many variables at once.22 Equally important, the approach must be contextu-
alized, because no two cases, no two sets of litigants, will ever display exactly
the same set of relevant characteristics. Since dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
details are relevant to a case's resolution, the likelihood that identical cases
will recur is remote. Therefore, we can dispense with stare decisis, the rule of
law, written opinions, and judicial review.
23
If we can get complaining groups-say, mistreated women, disgruntled
workers, or residents complaining of environmental nuisances-to agree to
this view of their problem, considerable gains will accrue. Their agreement
will postpone the day they coalesce to combat their common grievance. More-
over, the long list of relevant items will help diffuse indignation; we may even
be able to get them to admit that their problem is partly their own fault.
This approach will work with groups who distrust law (the opposite of the
first group),2 4 who do not want to cause trouble, who are prone to think of
problems as caused by lack of caring or failure to communicate. 25 The move-
ment toward alternative dispute resolution illustrates the second approach.
Relegating many problems to alternative forums is enormously beneficial to
in which racial remediation law focuses on vicious-willed racists, punishes them, and deems racism
cured).
18. Id.
19. Cf. Delgado et al., 1985 Wis. L. Rev. (cited in note 6).
20. Hofrichter at 82, 147; Goldberg et al. at 369-71; Delgado et al., 1985 Wis. L. Rev. at
1367, 1374.
21. Sources cited in note 20 supra.
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23. Delgado et al., 1985 Wis. L. Rev. at 1374; Hofrichter at 146.
24. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. Cf. Hofrichrer at 121-58; Goldberg et al. at 91.
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those in power. It takes the sharp edge off claims, diffusing them into genera-
lized grievances to be worked out, harmoniously if possible, on a case-by-case
basis. It is an excellent way of seeming to be doing something about intracta-
ble social problems while actually doing relatively little. It enables us to
"bury" claims in a mass of irrelevant detail. ADR, in short, is a powerful
means of replicating current social arrangements and power distributions.
Replication occurs because problems are not faced, responsibility is diffused,
grievants are cooled out, while everyone leaves thinking something positive
has been done.
WHEN GRIEVANCES REFUSE TO REMAIN BURIED:
ADR AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF PREJUDICE
Some grievances will not succumb to burial. They will retain their sharp
edges despite being embedded in a mass of extraneous detail. The grievant
will decline ADR's demand for peace, for compromise, and insist that his or
her problem be dealt with in accord with justice. In disputes of this type-
ones that retain their initial polarity-a second problem with ADR emerges:
ADR may expose vulnerable disputants to a heightened risk of class- or race-
based prejudice. ADR has been promoted, to a large extent, under the ban-
ner of egalitarianism. Moreover, it is aimed at groups-such as consumers,
workers, the poor, or divorcing women-that are particularly vulnerable to
stigma and bias. Thus, if ADR, rather than helping members of those groups
obtain justice, affirmatively injures their chances, ADR will be at best a very
mixed blessing.
The argument that this is so proceeds in three steps. The first is to ob-
serve that ADR, in contrast to formal, in-court adjudication, contains rela-
tively few checks and rules to confine prejudice. The second is to understand,
with the aid of social science analysis, how prejudice works. This will entail an
examination of leading theories of prejudice and prejudice's expression to see
how different settings encourage or discourage prejudiced behavior. The final
step consists of applying social science knowledge to the formalism/
nonformalism dichotomy in dispute resolution.
Formal Adjudication and Constraints on Prejudice
Formal adjudication contains a multitude of rules and practices the effect,
and sometimes intent, of which is to constrain bias and prejudice. These
range from rules dealing with disqualification of judges26 and jurors for bias,
27
26. See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(c)(1)(a) (1972).
27. See A. Ginger, 1 Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal Trials 45 (1985); 28 U.S.C. 144,
455 (1982).
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to rules that protect the jury from prejudicial influence.2" Judges may admon-
ish jurors not to discuss the case with outsiders or read news accounts of the
trial.29 Severe sanctions may be imposed on persons who attempt to bias or
tamper with a jury.30 Moreover, studies indicate that simply becoming a mem-
ber of a jury has a fairness-inducing effect on jurors, causing them to display a
greater degree of impartiality and fairness than they ordinarily do in daily
life. 3
In addition, rules of procedure and evidence constrain the scope of irrele-
vant inquiries, possible sources of prejudice or bias. Pleadings that contain
scandalous or irrlevant material may be stricken; 32 questioning of witnesses
that is too wide-ranging or intrusive may be stopped.33 The pleadings and
pretrial order confine the matters tried to the relevant issues. 34 Rules of ethi-
cal responsibility exhort lawyers to treat each other, the opposite party, and
the court with respect.
35
Formal adjudication thus contains a panoply of rules and practices that
limit discretion-discretion that could be wielded against a black, a female, or
a member of some other outgroup. ADR, to date, has few such devices. In-
deed, the lack of procedural complexity is touted as an advantage-it enables
ADR to be speedy, flexible, and nonintimidating. This is, of course, only to
say that ADR opens the door to prejudice somewhat wider than does formal,
in-court adjudication. Whether any characteristic of ADR affirmatively en-
courages or brings out such behavior is the next question to be explored.
Theories of Prejudice and Nonformal Disputing
To say that prejudice is possible in ADR-that the absence of formal
rules and structures permits prejudice-is not to say that prejudice is likely,
much less certain, to manifest itself. Yet, a consideration of social science
writing on prejudice suggests that this likelihood is very real.
There are a number of overlapping theories-psychodynamic theories,3 6
28. Ginger at 23-24; 18 U.S.C. 1503 (1982); 42 U.S.C. 1985 (1982).
29. Cf. Ginger at 59; United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 155 (6th Cir. 1978); cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 494 (1966).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). See also id. R. 11 (permitting assessing costs against attorneys who
plead in bad faith).
33. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; see id. R. 103, 105.
34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; Brook Village North Assocs. v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66,
71 (Ist Cir. 1982).
35. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.4 (1983).
36. See T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson, & R. Sanford, The Authoritarian
Personality (1969); G. Simpson & J. Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of
Prejudice and Discrimination 78 (4th ed. 1972) ("Simpson & Yinger"); see generally Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317
(1987).
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socio-economic theories, 37 and social-psychological/learning theories3s -that
seek to explain how it is that individuals in our society come to harbor preju-
dice toward outgroups. For our purpose, it is not essential to single out one
"best" theory; indeed, it seems likely that no one theory can explain the com-
plex, multifaceted phenomena of racism.
Whatever its origin or etiology, prejudice is widespread in American soci-
ety-surveys and polls indicate that most Americans harbor some degree of
prejudice toward members of groups other than their own.39 The expression of
prejudice is far from simple, however, and certainly not automatic. Most
Americans feel constrained by the provisions of the "American Creed," which
emphasizes egalitarianism, fairness, and justice for all.40 Prejudice's expression
is therefore said to be context-bound, or environmentally conditioned.
4'
Some settings remind us of the need to act according to our "public" values-
the values of the American Creed. In other, more intimate settings, we feel
more comfortable telling a racial joke, discriminating against a Jew or black, or
treating a woman or child dismissively.
4 2
Unlike with theories of prejudice's origins, there is relatively widespread
agreement among social scientists on how prejudice is best contained. Much
prejudice is environmentally induced-individuals express it because the envi-
ronment encourages or tolerates it. 43 In some settings, persons feel free to act
in prejudiced fashion; in others, they do not. The principal feature that sup-
presses prejudice is the certainty that prejudice, if displayed, will be remarked
and punished-that it will not be tolerated but will result in active condemna-
tion. This "confrontation" theory44 is probably the majority view among
American social scientists today on how best to contain and discourage
prejudice.
These social science insights shed light on the ability of different dispute
resolution forums to minimize bias. The formalities of a court trial are calcu-
lated to check prejudice. The trappings of formality-the flags, black robes,
the rituals-remind the participants that trials are occasions on which the
higher values of the American Creed are to preponderate, rather than the less
37. E.g., J. Kovel, White Racism-A Psychohistory 44 (1984) ("Kovel, White Racism"); I.
Katz, Stigma-A Social Psychological Analysis (1981) ("Katz, Stigma"); G. Myrdal, An American
Dilemma (1962) ("Myrdal").
38. G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (25th Anniversary Ed. 1979) ("Allport"). See Simp-
son & Yinger at 107; M. Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Children (rev. ed. 1964).
39. Allport at 79-80, 197-202. See Racism Flares on Campus, Time, Dec. 89, 1980, at 28
(racism now acceptable in some quarters following change in national mood).
40. The term American Creed was coined by Myrdal (cited in note 37). It includes values that
stem from the tenets of democratic and Judeo-Christian teachings, id at 23.
41. See Allport at 337-38; P. Van den Berghe, Race and Racism 20-21 (2d ed. 1978).
42. See generally Myrdal; Katz, Stigma at 23; Kovel, White Racism at 54-55.
43. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
44. E.g., Katz at 16, 109; Allport at 327-28; Katz & Gurin, Race Relations and the Social
Sciences: Overview and Further Discussion, in I. Katz & P. Gurin, eds., Race and the Social
Sciences 342, 373 (1969); Westie, The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test, 30 Am. Soc. Rev.
527, 529 (1965).
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noble values we embrace during times of intimacy. Equality of status is sought
to be preserved-each party is represented by a lawyer and has a prescribed
time and manner of speaking. Counsel direct their arguments not toward
each other but toward a neutral judge or jury. Adjudication avoids the un-
structured, unchecked, low-visibility types of interaction that, according to so-
cial scientists, foster prejudice. The rules confine litigants and counsel to
relevant matters, coercing them to remain on point, thereby limiting their
ability, at least overtly, to call up and evoke status- or class-based differences
among the parties.
Recent writing on the psychology of the victims of racism suggest that
formality deters unfairness in a third way. It not only encourages mediators
and disputants of the majority race to behave more fairly than they otherwise
might; it also encourages minority-race persons to press their claims more
forthrightly. The assurance that an encounter is governed by ostensibly neu-
tral rules and procedures counteracts defeatism and apathy born of sad experi-
ence.45 The more assertive behavior of minority claimants becomes self-
fulfilling; they act as though they will be treated fairly, and this causes others
in fact to treat them more fairly than they otherwise might.
46
CONCLUSION
Deformalized justice can defuse legitimate grievances by burying them in
a mass of detail. Just as courts and legislatures can narrow legal rules so that
entire categories of grievance become unrecognizable, shrunken versions of
their former selves, ADR can, by expanding disputes beyond recognition,
cause them to lose their urgency and sharp edges. When ADR cannot avoid
dealing with sharply contested claims, its structureless setting and absence of
formal rules increase the likelihood of an outcome colored by prejudice, with
the result that the haves once again come out ahead. Deformalized justice is
far from the panacea some of its proponents claim; recent writing is moving in
the direction of identifying some of its liabilities. Books like Goldberg, Green,
and Sander's, Harrington's, and Hofrichter's are a step in the right direction.
45. See Grambs, Negro Self-concept Reappraised, in J. Banks & J. Grambs, eds., Black Self-
Concept: Implications for Education and Social Sciences 184 (1972); see Simpson & Yinger at
730.
46. Cf. Abel, Politics at 267, 309 (dispossessed instinctively prefer formal institutions, dis-
trust informality).
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